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INTRODUCTION 
Jose, an immigrant entrepreneur, came to America 
seeking the American dream.1  Like many before him, Jose 
understood that this dream could be realized only through 
earning a quality education.  However, like most immigrants, 
Jose could not afford to pay for his schooling, so he sought 
entrepreneurial methods to pay his tuition.  He devised a plan 
to purchase, in a foreign country, books published in America 
at rates lower than the retail price found in America, and 
then sell these books in America at a discounted price.  Once 
 
 1.  Jose is a fictional character used to highlight the main point which this article 
addresses.  
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the publishers found out about Jose’s business, they sought 
injunctive relief in order to stop his book sales immediately.  
This article addresses whether a plaintiff, seeking an 
injunction, must actually prove that the defendant’s actions 
caused the plaintiff irreparable harm or whether irreparable 
harm is presumed from a finding of copyright infringement. 
Injunctive relief is a drastic measure.  In his article, 
Andrew F. Spillane argues that an injunction should always 
flow from copyright infringement, as irreparable harm should 
be presumed.2  However, Spillane’s argument fails to correctly 
analyze a Supreme Court decision indicating that irreparable 
harm must be demonstrated.  Further, he fails to 
appropriately address the fact that requiring the plaintiff to 
demonstrate irreparable harm would lead to a more equitable 
result. 
A copyright is a set of exclusive rights granted by the 
federal government to the creator of an original work for a 
limited period of time.3  This includes the right to copy, 
distribute, perform, display, and adapt the work.4  The 
Constitution protects both patents and copyrights in order “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”5  Thus, 
the Founding Fathers appreciated the important role played 
by patents and copyrights in promoting economic incentives 
for innovation and creativity.6 
Injunctive relief is a powerful tool within the arsenal of the 
courts.  It can protect victims of intellectual property 
infringement by ordering defendants to cease their infringing 
activities.7  Prior to the seminal Supreme Court decision on 
injunctive relief, eBay v. MercExchange,8 a plaintiff needed to 
show only past copyright infringement and a likelihood of 
future infringement to obtain injunctive relief, as irreparable 
 
 2.  Andrew F. Spillane, Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm in Copyright Cases, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 257, 258 (2011). 
 3.  Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 6.  Jeffrey M. Sanchez, Comment, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the 
Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law Will Survive eBay and Winter, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 535, 560 (2011).  
 7.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 258.  
 8.  547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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harm was presumed.9  In eBay, the Supreme Court held that, 
even in cases of intellectual property infringement, the 
traditional four-factor test of equity must be satisfied before 
injunctive relief may properly be granted.  The four-factor test 
requires: (1) that a plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury in 
the absence of an injunction; (2) that remedies available at 
law are inadequate to compensate for the injury; (3) that 
considering the balance of the hardships between the plaintiff 
and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) 
that the public interest would not be disserved by the 
injunction.10 
Spillane argues that the courts should “graft a rebuttable 
presumption of irreparable harm into the first eBay factor in 
order to regain the traditional rule’s clarity and 
predictability.”11  Spillane believes that, without an 
injunction, “a mere damage award would effectively license 
the infringing behavior, allowing copyright defendants to 
infringe a copyright owner’s exclusive rights [so] long as those 
defendants are willing and able to pay the consequential or 
statutory damages.”12 
Spillane presents six arguments why courts should 
continue to presume irreparable harm in cases of copyright 
infringement.13  He proposes that the presumption should 
continue to apply to: (1) protect a copyright holder’s property 
right to exclude; (2) remove the issue of judicial distrust 
towards defendant’s assertions of voluntary cessation; (3) 
maintain the interdependent relationship between property 
rights and the protective remedies for those rights; (4) 
conserve judicial resources; (5) allow general rules while 
prohibiting categorical rules; and (6) follow history and 
tradition in equity practice.14 
This Comment addresses the weaknesses of Spillane’s 
argument that courts should maintain the presumption of 
 
 9.  CBS Broad Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 450 F.3d 505, 509 (11th Cir. 
2006); Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 
2003); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Universal City 
Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981); Elektra Entm’t 
Group Inc. v. Brimley, No. 205-134, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56798 at *9 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 
15, 2006). 
 10.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
 11.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 260.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 282-293. 
 14.  Id. 
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irreparable harm in the face of the eBay decision.  Part I of 
this Comment examines the legislative background that led to 
copyright law as we know it today, and reviews the pre-eBay 
standard for injunctive relief.  Part II addresses eBay’s 
progression through the federal courts, the standard that 
emerged in the Supreme Court’s holding, and the confusion 
that has resulted regarding whether the presumption still 
applies.  Part III demonstrates that the Supreme Court 
intended to eliminate the presumption in the eBay decision, 
and that this leads to a more equitable result. Part IV raises 
separate arguments supporting the proposition that the 
presumption’s removal is more equitable. Finally, Part V 
provides a brief conclusion of the arguments raised. 
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
Congress has granted federal courts the authority to issue 
injunctive relief under 17 USCS § 502.15  The statute states: 
“any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under 
this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 
28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it 
may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a 
copyright.”16  Courts interpret the word “may” to imply that 
the issuance of an injunction is subject to a court’s 
discretion.17 
The Copyright Act itself, however, implies less room for 
judicial discretion, stating that, “if any person shall infringe 
the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws 
of the United States such person shall be liable. . .to an 
injunction restraining such infringement.”18  However, courts 
have traditionally demanded certain preliminary 
requirements before issuing injunctive relief.19  Prior to eBay, 
in both patent and copyright infringement cases, courts 
required a de minimis showing of past infringement, and a 
likelihood of future infringement.20  Following eBay, a plaintiff 
 
 15.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433-34 (1984). 
 16.  17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006). 
 17.   Yule Kim, Cong. Research Serv., 97-589, Statutory Interpretation: General 
Principles and Recent Trends 9 (2008). 
 18.  § 502(a) (2006). 
 19.  Phillips v. Const. Publ’g Co., 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 69, 69-70 (N.D. Ga. 1947).  
 20.  CBS Broad Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns. Corp., 450 F.3d 505, 509 (11th Cir. 
2006); Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 
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must satisfy the four-factor test of equity prior to obtaining 
injunctive relief.21 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Emerging Standard For Injunctive Relief in 
Infringement Cases 
1. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
In eBay, MercExchange patented a business-method22 that 
allows individuals to buy and sell goods from one another 
electronically.23  Both eBay and Half.com refused to license 
this patent from MercExchange.24  At trial, the jury found 
that eBay and Half.com both infringed MercExchange’s 
patent.25  Despite the jury’s finding of infringement, the 
district court refused to grant injunctive relief because 
MercExchange failed to satisfy the four-factor test.26  The 
court explained that relief would be improper because of the 
“plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents” and the fact that 
“its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents” 
demonstrated that the patent holder would not suffer 
irreparable harm.27 
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s 
application of the traditional four-pronged equity test to cases 
of patent infringement.28  It held that courts should generally 
 
2003); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 21.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 22.  Business-methods are still patentable in the wake of the Supreme Courts 
recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010). There, the Court ruled 
that the term “process,” from 35 USCS § 101, “at least as a textual matter and before 
consulting other limitations in the Patent Act and this Court’s precedents, may include 
at least some methods of doing business.” Id.   
 23.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 388. MercExchange actually sought to license its business 
patent to eBay, but a settlement could not be reached.  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 393. 
 27.  Id. Since the advent of “patent trolls,” entities who buy and enforce patents 
against infringers without any intention of using the patented invention themselves, 
some courts have tried to make it more difficult to win injunctions. Jack C. Schecter, 
Are “Patent Trolls” Facing A New Era of Litigation Penalties?, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 
5885 (2011). This likely influenced the district court’s decision in denying the 
injunction. Sanchez, supra note 6, at 540. 
 28. Id. at 393.  
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issue injunctions in cases of patent infringement absent 
exceptional circumstances.29 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
“whether the Federal Circuit erred in setting forth a general 
rule in patent cases that a district court must, absent 
exceptional circumstances, issue a permanent injunction after 
a finding of infringement.”30  The Court held that neither the 
district court nor the court of appeals applied the appropriate 
test in determining whether to issue injunctive relief upon a 
finding of patent infringement.31  The Court explained that 
the district court erred by applying an overly expansive test 
that would prevent patent holders that choose only to license 
their patents to receive injunctive relief.32  The Court also 
explained that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply 
the traditional four-factor test.33  Thus, the Court remanded 
for further proceedings in accordance with the appropriate 
application of the four-factor test for injunctive relief.34 
On remand, the district court analyzed “whether a 
presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of validity 
and infringement survives the Supreme Court’s opinion 
remanding this case.”35  The district court held, “a review of 
relevant case law, as well as the language of the Supreme 
Court’s decision, supports defendants’ position that such [a] 
presumption no longer exists.”36 
Virtually all courts have agreed that eBay eliminated the 
presumption of irreparable harm in the patent context.37  
Further, most courts generally apply eBay’s holding to cases 
 
 29.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 393.  
 30.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 277. 
 31.  eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 393. 
 32.  Id. The court held that the extra factors taken into account by the district 
court were beyond the scope of the four-factor test. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 394. 
 35.  MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Va. 2007).  
 36.  Id.; See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 
2006) (concluding that the language in the Supreme Court’s eBay opinion “does not 
imply a presumption, but places the burden of proving irreparable injury upon the 
plaintiff”); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
61600, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (“The eBay decision demonstrates that no 
presumption of irreparable harm should automatically follow from a finding of 
infringement.”). 
 37.  See Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 
2011); z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 440; Paice LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600; 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 532 (1987). 
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of copyright infringement.38 
2. Winter v. NRDC, Inc.39 
In Winter, the National Resources Defense Counsel 
(NRDC) sought an injunction against the United States Navy 
to prevent the Navy from engaging in antisubmarine warfare 
training sessions using mid-frequency active sonar off the 
coast of California.40  The NRDC asserted that the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) required the Navy 
to prepare an environmental impact statement assessing the 
impact of these naval exercises on marine mammals prior to 
engaging in the training exercises.41  Both the district court 
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
injunction based, at least in part, on NRDC establishing a 
possibility of irreparable harm.42  The Supreme Court, 
reversing the court of appeals, explained that injunctive relief 
should be granted only when irreparable injury is likely, not 
merely possible.43 
Although Winter did not involve any issue of intellectual 
property rights, several courts have cited to it in holding that 
the presumption of irreparable harm is no longer valid.44  For 
example, in Flexible Lifeline Sys. v. Precision Lift, Inc.,45  the 
Ninth Circuit vacated an injunction issued by the district 
court because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable 
 
 38.  Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d 
1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008); Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 
543 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court[‘s eBay decision] reaffirmed the traditional 
showing that a plaintiff must make in order to obtain a permanent injunction in any 
type of case, including a patent or copyright case”); See also  Metro-Goldwyn-
MayerStudios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1208-10 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 39.  555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
 40.  Id. at 8. 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 22 (Stating that “issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a 
possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive 
relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 
the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. Our frequently reiterated standard requires 
plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in 
the absence of an injunction.”). 
 44.  Flexible Lifeline Sys. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77-78 (2d. Cir. 2010); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Apple Inc. v. Psystar 
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (2009). 
 45.  654 F.3d at 995. 
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harm in a copyright infringement case.  According to the 
court, “after the Supreme Court’s eBay and Winter decisions 
in 2006 and 2008, this circuit’s long-standing practice of 
presuming irreparable harm upon the showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits in a copyright infringement case is no 
longer good law.”46 
B. Recent Court Approaches to the Presumption of Irreparable 
Harm 
In the wake of eBay and Winter, courts have taken two 
different approaches to the traditionally recognized 
presumption of irreparable harm in copyright infringement 
cases.47  Some courts hold that the presumption is no longer 
valid,48 while others maintain the presumption’s validity in 
cases of copyright infringement.49 
1. The Presumption is No Longer Valid 
In Salinger v. Colting, J.D. Salinger brought a copyright 
infringement suit against an author for allegedly copying 
scenes, characters, events, and other elements from Salinger’s 
classic novel, Catcher in the Rye.50  Upon establishing a prima 
facie case of copyright infringement, Salinger sought 
injunctive relief from the district court.51  The court, 
interpreting eBay to affect only cases of patent infringement, 
presumed irreparable harm and issued a preliminary 
injunction.52  On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the 
injunction, holding that eBay equally applies to cases of 
 
 46.  Id.; See also Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77-78;MGM Studios, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 
1209; Apple, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 948. 
 47.  Compare Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77-78; GM Studios, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1209; 
Apple, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 948; with courts still holding of the presumption: Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. Zahn, No. 3:06-0212, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11426 at *10 (M.D. Tenn. 
Feb. 16, 2007). Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (2007). 
 48.  Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77-78; MGM Studios, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1209; Apple, 673 
F. Supp. 2d at 948. 
 49.  McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 882; Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No. 
07-cv-11446, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115734 at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); Microsoft 
Corp. v. Atek 3000 Computer, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56689 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 
2008); Zahn, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11426 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2007). 
 50.  Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77-78. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
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copyright infringement53 stating that eBay “eviscerated the 
presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of a 
likelihood of success on the merits in copyright cases.”54  
Similarly, courts in the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have directly rejected the presumption in cases of copyright 
infringement.55 
2. The Presumption Survives in the Copyright Context 
In Microsoft v. McGee,56  the defendant distributed 
counterfeit and infringing software programs that were 
developed and licensed by the plaintiff.  Once the plaintiff 
demonstrated a prima facie case of infringement, the court 
reviewed the four-pronged test set forth in eBay, holding that 
under the first prong,57 irreparable harm is automatically 
presumed upon any showing of copyright infringement.58  
District courts in the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits have 
reached the same conclusion.59  However, none of these courts 
adequately explain its conclusion.  Rather, these courts 
simply cite to pre-eBay cases as precedent for the 
presumption, which includes cases that are no longer good 
law.60 
 
 
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Sanchez, supra note 6, at 545. 
 55.   Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d 
1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008); Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 
543 (4th Cir. 2007) (The Supreme Court’s eBay decision reaffirmed the traditional 
showing that a plaintiff must make in order to obtain a permanent injunction in any 
type of case, including a patent or copyright case.); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1208-10 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Arlington Indus. v. 
Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-1105, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77592 at *24 (M.D. 
Pa. July 18, 2011). 
 56.  490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
 57.  The first prong: that the plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury. 
 58.  McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 877. 
 59.  Id. at 882; Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
115734 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); Microsoft Corp. v. Atek 3000 Computer, Inc., No. 07-cv-
11446, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56689 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2008); Capitol Records, 
Inc. v. Zahn, NO. 3:06-0212, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11426 at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 
2007). 
 60.  See McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 882 (citing Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 
82 F.Supp.2d 211, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); Microsoft, No. 06-cv-6403, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 56689 at *15 (quoting MyWebGrocer, LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 
193 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
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III. ARGUMENTS DEMONSTRATING THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF 
IRREPARABLE HARM IS NO LONGER VALID 
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address 
whether its eBay decision intended to abrogate the 
presumption of irreparable harm, most courts agree that such 
an interpretation is warranted.61  Admittedly, however, the 
eBay decision did allow room for some confusion by failing to 
specifically state its holding applies to copyright infringement 
cases.  This failure allowed commentators such as Spillane to 
propose justifications for not applying the presumption to the 
copyright context.62  However, these justifications are 
insufficient to overcome the reality that the presumption “has 
left the building.”63 
 
 
A. Protecting the Right to Exclude of a Copyright Holder 
1. Spillane’s Argument in Favor of the Presumption’s 
Validity 
Spillane argues in favor of the presumption’s validity.  
Copyright infringement involves the invasion of a copyright 
holder’s right to the exclusive use of his work.64  A copyright’s 
exclusivity can be characterized by two points: (1) the 
copyright’s nature as a monopoly; and (2) the method used in 
policing infringement of a copyright.65 
The Constitution authorizes Congress to pass legislation 
on copyright matters.66  With this power, Congress enacted 
the Copyright Act granting authors an “exclusive right” to 
their copyrightable works.67  This exclusivity provides a 
monopolistic right to a copyright owner, barring others from 
use of their work.  However, a monopoly ceases to exist when 
parties other than the copyright owner use the copyrighted 
 
 61.  See supra notes, 36-38. 
 62.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 282-285. 
 63.  Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 64.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 282. 
 65.  Id.at 283.  
 66.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 67.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 283; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
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content.68  Thus, requiring irreparable harm before granting 
injunctive relief weakens this monopoly, making it easier to 
infringe without consequences. 
Furthermore, by granting causes of action in instances of 
infringement, the Copyright Act imposes supervision rights 
upon the copyright holder.69  While in many instances of 
infringement: 
[a damage award] may account for the losses resulting from the 
infringement and profits the defendants may have garnered from 
their infringing activities, and may deter future infringement by 
making the cost of that activity prohibitive, a mere damage award 
runs the risk of judicially licensing infringement where the 
Copyright Act otherwise has not provided for compulsory licenses.70 
In other words, defendants may find it better to infringe 
and pay for the resulting damage judgments, particularly if 
the infringer is a corporation with sufficient capital to bear 
the cost of such judgments.71  According to Justice Scalia, 
allowing only monetary damages to be awarded is equivalent 
to the judiciary saying to the patent holder, “Here, take your 
money,” and to the infringer, “You, God bless you, go continue 
to violate the patent.”72  This scenario would force copyright 
owners to constantly litigate in order to protect their exclusive 
rights against wealthy companies that can easily afford such 
litigation.73 
As such, Spillane argues that the continuance of the 
presumption of irreparable harm will protect this monopoly 
and appropriately address these supervision concerns. Thus, 
he finds that the presumptions’ viability in copyright actions 
should survive the eBay decision.74 
2. Argument Against the Presumption’s Validity 
Through the ideological principles and intent of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, it is clear that the 
presumption should continue neither in patent infringement 
 
 68.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 283. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 284. 
 71.  Id. at 285. 
 72.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 276 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130)). 
 73.  Id.at 275.  
 74.  Id. at 292. 
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nor copyright infringement.  In making this argument, this 
section first addresses the issue of a copyright holder’s 
monopoly and then addresses the copyright holder’s self-
supervising role.  Finally, a review of the Court’s language in 
eBay clearly indicates that the presumption should not be 
applied in the copyright context. 
a. Copyright Holder’s Monopoly 
Congress has granted both patent and copyright owners 
an exclusive monopoly.75  The crux of a copyright holder’s 
“exclusive right” to the property is found under the Copyright 
Act.  Congress virtually granted this same protection to 
patent holders in the Patent Act.76  That is, under the same 
Constitutional Clause used to create the Copyright Act, 
Congress enacted the Patent Act granting the patent holder 
an exclusive monopoly as well.77  While Spillane argues that 
an injunction is required to protect this monopoly,78 his view 
contradicts the holding of the Supreme Court.79  Spillane 
admits that the eBay ruling removes the presumption in the 
patent context.  However, he argues that this ruling does not 
extend to copyrights.80  Nevertheless, since rights to both a 
copyright and a patent arise from the same Constitutional 
Clause, and both Acts are framed in similar language, it is 
inappropriate to demand different standards for injunctive 
relief between these two species of intellectual property.  
Thus, just as the Supreme Court requires a showing of 
irreparable harm upon a finding of patent infringement, 
despite the “monopoly” granted to patent holders by Congress, 
a copyright holder’s “monopoly,” which is no more powerful 
than a patent owner’s, does not warrant a different standard. 
b. Self-Policing 
Patents and copyrights share the same infringement 
 
 75.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). 
 76.  § 261. 
 77.  35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 78.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 283. 
 79.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E. D. Va. 2007). 
 80.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 279-82. The only argument Spillane addresses is the 
split of authority over whether the presumption is removed in the copyright context. Id. 
He does not contend that the presumption remains in the patent context. Id. 
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concerns and the same self-policing mechanisms.  In Section 
281, Congress awarded self-policing rights to patent holders 
and granted them causes of action to protect against patent 
infringement.81  Similarly, in Section 501, Congress granted 
copyright holders causes of action in cases of infringement, 
allowing them to self-supervise their creations.82  Yet, the 
eBay Court did not believe that a prima facie case of patent 
infringement necessarily justifies an injunction.83  In other 
words, the Supreme Court was not concerned that 
corporations with enough capital may choose to keep 
infringing at the expense of simply paying penalty fees.84  
Similarly, fear of mandated copyright infringement is no 
greater a concern; it is therefore not deserving of stronger 
protection than patent infringement through a presumption of 
irreparable harm.  Thus, it is insufficient to say that in the 
copyright realm, which has similar policing mechanisms to 
patent infringement and the same capability to infringe and 
pay, the presumption of irreparable harm should remain 
despite the Court’s decision in eBay. 
Moreover, the premise that monetary damages are often 
insufficient is misleading.85  It is true that in contrast to a 
patent holder, who may seek punitive damages upon a prima 
facie showing of patent infringement,86 the majority of courts 
hold that a copyright holder may not pursue punitive 
damages.87  However, a copyright holder is entitled to either 
actual damages along with the additional profits of the 
infringer, or statutory damages.88  When actual damages are 
awarded, the victim of copyright infringement is made 
 
 81.  35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006). 
 82.  17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006). 
 83.  eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,395 (2006) (stating the fact that in 
the vast majority of cases courts have granted injunctive relief upon a showing of 
patent infringement “does not entitle a patentee to a permanent injunction or justify a 
general rule that such injunctions should issue); see also Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865-867 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 84.  See eBay, 547 U.S. at 396. 
 85.  Spillane raises the argument that rich corporations could easily infringe and 
pay even the maximum damages while continuing to make a profit. Spillane, supra text 
accompanying note 2, at 284-85. 
 86.  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 87.  Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Epcon Group, Inc. v. Danburry Farms, Inc., 28 F. App’x 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Leutwyler v. Royal Hashemite Court of Jordan, 184 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 88.  17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). 
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whole.89  However, in cases granting statutory damages to 
copyright holders, it is within the courts’ discretion to award a 
minimum of $750 and a maximum of $30,000 per 
infringement.90  Furthermore, upon willful infringement, the 
court may impose damage awards of up to $150,000 per 
infringement.91  In fact, these damages have been specifically 
created to provide adequate compensation to the copyright 
holder, to discourage wrongful conduct, and to deter 
infringements.92  Thus, even though copyright infringements 
cannot lead to the kinds of punitive damages awarded for 
patent infringements, large corporations will not be more 
inclined to engage in copyright infringement because 
copyright infringement can still result in significant financial 
loss. 
c. Direct Interpretation of eBay Implies its Holding 
Applies Equally to Copyright Infringement 
In eBay, the Supreme Court openly declared that the four-
pronged test for injunctive relief “is consistent with our 
treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act.”93  The 
Court further stated that these traditional principles of equity 
apply, “in patent disputes no less than in other cases 
governed by such standards.”94  Thus, the only relevant issue 
is whether the Supreme Court in eBay removed the 
presumption altogether in cases of patent infringement since 
that would also remove the presumption from copyright 
infringement injunctions.  As the district court in eBay found 
on remand, “a review of relevant case law, as well as the 
 
 89.  See e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 208 (2000), (Wal-Mart 
infringed upon Samara Brothers’ copyrights by selling knockoffs.  In granting actual 
damages to the Samara Brothers, the jury awarded the full $1.15 million of Wal-Mart’s 
gleaned profits from copying Samara Brothers’ materials, in addition to fees and costs. 
Id.  
 90.  § 504(c)(1).  
 91.  Id. In contrast, in the Ninth Circuit courts go so far as to hold statutory 
damages must be in excess of the amount that would have been awarded as profits or 
actual damages alone, assuming either profits or actual damages have already been 
ascertained. Kamar Int’l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 829 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 
Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 520 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
 92.   “The statutory purposes of the Copyright Act of 1909 are to provide adequate 
compensation to the copyright holder and to discourage wrongful conduct and deter 
infringements.” Kamar Int’l, 829 F.2d at 786. 
 93.  eBay v. MerckExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).  
 94.  Id. at 394 (Roberts, CJ, concurring). 
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language of the Supreme Court’s decision, supports the 
position that such presumption no longer exists.”95  
Accordingly, courts are erring by continuing to apply the 
presumption. 
d. Summation 
Spillane’s arguments are not sufficient for the 
presumption to survive the eBay decision.  Patents and 
copyrights share the same bundle of rights granted by 
Congress.96  Furthermore, they both have similar self-policing 
mechanisms and in both types of infringement cases, the 
subsequent monetary damages available to a plaintiff are 
sufficient to deter corporations with large amounts of 
capital.97  Hence, there is no reason to adopt Spillane’s 
proposal and apply different standards between patent law 
and copyright law.98  Finally, the Court’s decision in eBay 
demonstrates that its ruling should apply equally to both 
copyright infringement and patent infringement.99 
B. Judicial Distrust of Defendant’s Assertions of Voluntary 
Cessation 
1. Spillane’s Arguments in Favor of the Presumption’s 
Validity 
In prior cases of copyright infringement, courts have held 
that defendants lack good faith in their assertions that they 
will stop their infringing activity.100  They have also held that 
the threat of future infringement undermines the exclusive 
right granted to copyright holders such that injunctive relief 
is required to protect this right.101  Both in Tanenbaum102 and 
 
 95.  See supra notes 36-38. 
 96.  See infra Part III., Section A, Subpart 2, Subsection b. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No. 07-cv-11446, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 115734 at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 
567 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 101.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 284-85. 
 102.  In Tenenbaum, the defendant used an audio sharing device to distribute 381 
infringed audio files over the internet. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115734. 
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Walt Disney Co.103 the defendants infringed upon issued 
copyrights.  In both cases, the courts imposed permanent 
injunctions to ensure infringement protection based on the 
belief that the defendants would otherwise further infringe 
the plaintiffs’ copyrights.104  Spillane argues that a 
presumption of irreparable harm will impose a burden of 
proof upon a defendant to provide that his or her infringing 
activity does not demonstrate irreparable harm.105  With this 
burden, a judge may more accurately assess a defendant’s 
assertions that he or she will cease the infringing activity 
once the case ends.106 
2. Argument against the Presumption’s Validity 
Spillane points only to Tanenbaum and Walt Disney Co. in 
making his argument because there are no other cases 
asserting this judicial distrust principle.  Every other court 
that has addressed this issue has interpreted the Supreme 
Court to have rejected the notion that an injunction 
automatically follows a copyright infringement 
determination.107  As such, cases prior to eBay, such as Walt 
Disney Co. have been overruled and lack any persuasive force.  
Moreover, any case to the contrary decided after eBay is 
simply not in accordance with precedent in light of the above 
arguments.108  Thus, Tanenbaum was mistaken in granting 
the injunction without a further demonstration of irreparable 
harm regardless of the possibility of continued infringement. 
 
 
 103.  In Walt Disney, the defendant produced t-shirts with infringed symbols such as 
Playboy, the Hard Rock Café, Disney, and Georgetown University in quantities that the 
court could not assess accurately. Walt Disney, 897 F.2d at 567.  
 104.  Tenenbaum, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115734; Walt Disney, 897 F.2d at 567. 
 105.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 287. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2011); Robert Bosch 
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d. 1142, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir.  2011); Salinger v. Colting, 
607 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2010); Apple v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (N. D. 
Cal. 2009); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 
1209 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 108.  Wilson v. Brennan, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1265 (D.N.M. 2009) aff’d, 390 F. 
App’x 780 (10th Cir. 2010) (expressly stating that eBay rejects the notion that the 
injunction automatically follows a copyright infringement); Christopher Phelps & 
Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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C. The Interdependent Relationship Between Rights and 
Remedies 
1. Spillane’s Arguments in Favor of the Presumption’s 
Validity 
A reciprocal relationship exists between the rights and the 
remedies for violation of those rights; thus, a powerful 
remedial approach should exist in the event of copyright 
infringement, given its nature as an exclusive right.109  
According to Spillane, the substance of rights asserted often 
defines the nature and scope of the remedies for that right in 
the event of its violation because the proper remedy 
ultimately determines how and whether the right is properly 
vindicated.110  “Copyright owners hold a bundle of exclusive 
rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106, and these rights may cease to be 
exclusive where the Copyright Act does not provide [an 
appropriate remedy] when infringing behavior continues.”111  
Thus, because a copyright holder receives an explicit grant of 
exclusive rights, it deserves a strong reciprocal remedy in 
cases of infringement, such as injunctive relief.112  Therefore, 
Spillane argues for continuation of the presumption in cases 
of copyright infringement.113 
2. Argument Against the Presumption’s Validity 
The Supreme Court in eBay agrees that a strong right 
deserves a strong remedy.114  There, the Court noted that 
injunctions are warranted in cases of copyright infringement 
considering the substance of a copyright holder’s right; 
nevertheless, injunctive relief requires a sufficient showing of 
irreparable harm.115  eBay’s requirement that irreparable 
harm be demonstrated rather than presumed changes only 
the circumstances in which a court is allowed to find that 
irreparable harm exists.  Therefore, the substantive right 
itself is not diminished.  Rather, the factual standard 
 
 109.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 287-88. 
 110.  Id.   
 111.  Id. at 288.  
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See id. at 289.  
 114.  See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006). 
 115.  Id. 
ZEMEL_REPLY TO ANDREW F.DOCX  4/23/2014  10:44 AM 
2014] Reply to Andrew F. Spillane 305 
required to warrant this strong remedy has been raised to a 
likelihood of irreparable harm, as opposed to a mere 
possibility of such harm occurring.  It is this standard that 
allows for a more equitable result. 
D. Conserving Judicial Resources by Recognizing Trends 
1. Spillane’s Argument in Favor of the Presumption’s 
Validity 
Spillane also argues that “[t]he presumption also finds 
worth in its conservation of judicial resources.”116  Because 
irreparable harm will normally flow from cases of copyright 
infringement, presuming irreparable harm once infringement 
is shown saves time and money.117  Further, allowing the 
presumption to be rebutted increases accuracy in the 
presumably small set of cases that deviate from the norm.118  
As such, it would be more beneficial for courts themselves to 
continue the presumption. 
2. Argument against the Presumption’s Validity 
Allowing the presumption to continue would enable across-
the-board119 infringement litigation costs to continue their 
meteoric rise.  While the presumption existed in copyright 
cases, it virtually guaranteed an injunction in each case 
where the plaintiffs were able to prove past infringement.120  
With this fact becoming known, copyright owners began 
leveraging copyrights of little value into lucrative 
settlements.121  As such, continuing to presume irreparable 
harm furthers abusive copyright litigation. In fact, there are 
several aspects of copyright litigation that make it 
particularly conducive to frivolous or abusive litigation, 
demonstrating that removal of the presumption is more cost 
 
 116.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 289. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  This includes increasing costs for plaintiffs, defendants, and the judiciary. 
 120.  “From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief 
upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.” eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, CJ., concurring).  
 121.  Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual 
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512-20 (2003). 
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effective. 
First, copyright law asks the fact-finder to make a difficult 
subjective decision concerning whether the defendant 
unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s expressive work.122  
Aside from the already vague standards in place to determine 
whether infringement has occurred, trials often feature 
conflicting expert testimony about matters relevant to the 
scope of an intellectual property right.123  Compounding these 
problems is the risk of error by judges and juries.124  Trial 
errors are difficult to correct in intellectual property litigation 
because the complexity of the evidence can make it difficult 
for a deserving defendant to win summary judgment or even 
prevail at trial.125  Thus, high variance in the scope of rights 
makes it profitable for intellectual property plaintiffs with 
apparently narrow rights to gamble that a court will grant 
them broad rights. 
Second, a weak lawsuit presents a credible threat to a 
defendant for whom it is difficult to distinguish weak lawsuits 
from strong ones.126  A plaintiff with a weak lawsuit can 
successfully bluff a defendant because, in the early stages of 
intellectual property litigation, the plaintiff is likely to have 
better information about the scope and validity of its claim.127 
Third, a weak lawsuit may cause the defendant to settle—
either to avoid the nuisance of mounting a defense or because 
the cost of a strong defense threatens the defendant’s 
solvency.128  Alternatively, the threat of a weak lawsuit may 
deter entry into a given market if the plaintiff establishes a 
reputation for prosecuting weak suits through to the end.129  A 
plaintiff with a predatory reputation may rationally view 
losing a weak lawsuit as a profitable investment in that 
reputation.130 
Further, allowing the presumption of irreparable harm to 
remain enables copyright litigation costs to continue rising 
 
 122.  Brief for America Online, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
10, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Brief for America Online, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
10, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130). 
 128.   Id. at 11.  
 129.   Id. 
 130.   Id.  
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given the fact that no demonstration of irreparable harm need 
be shown.  According to economic reports, copyright litigation 
is expected to cost at least $600,000 for each party. 131  In fact, 
according to surveys taken by the American Intellectual 
Property Lawyers Association, from 2001 until 2007 there has 
been a 32% rise in copyright litigation.132  One way to stem 
this continued rise in litigation is to remove the presumption. 
This would require that each case have merit without 
presuming the merits, thereby substantially decreasing the 
incentives for infringement litigation. 
Fourth, well aware of the above-mentioned opportunities, 
professional copyright litigants opportunistically buy up 
copyrights solely for the purpose of suing past and future 
infringers.133  Such parties are known as copyright trolls.134  In 
Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. CNN, Inc., the plaintiff 
purchased the G.I. Joe copyright, with a clause that 
ownership would retroactively take effect two years prior to 
the date of purchase.135  The plaintiff then sued several news 
organizations for infringement for showing snippets of the 
films.136  Another instance of copyright trolling appeared in 
Righthaven LLC.137  There, the plaintiffs scoured the internet 
seeking online infringements of the Las Vegas Review 
Journal, purchased those copyrights, and commenced suit on 
the infringers.138  Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate actual 
harm, would decrease copyright trolling because, in most 
cases of trolling, irreparable harm is not present. 
Thus, allowing the presumption of irreparable harm to 
remain would in fact increase overall costs.  First, it enables 
potential plaintiffs to gamble on winning because the 
difficulty in understanding complex litigation has led to a 
 
 131.  Sanford E. Warren Jr., Intellectual Property Litigation Rising: How to Protect 
Your Company’s Financial Health, IRMI (Sept. 2009), http://www.irmi.com/expert/ 
articles/2009/warren09-intellectual-property-law.aspx (citing AIPLA Report of the 
Economic Survey, 25-26 (2007)). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Ashby Jones, Vegas, Baby! Ruling a Possible Boon to ‘Copyright-Troll’ Suits, 
WSJ L. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010, 3:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/03/vegas-baby-
ruling-a-possible-boon-to-copyright-troll-suits/. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  98 Civ. 7128, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15937, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2001). 
 136.  Id.at 14.  
 137.  Jones, supra note 133. Righthaven filed over 115 lawsuits of copyright 
infringement. Id. 
 138.  Id. 
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high variance of results. Second, it enables a plaintiff to bluff 
the defendant into settling because it does not need to 
demonstrate irreparable harm, and is thus in a better position 
than the defendant to know the likely outcome.  Third, the 
prohibitive cost of copyright litigation enables one to threaten 
suit in order to demand a settlement.  Finally, allowing the 
presumption to continue would increase the growing problem 
of copyright trolls.  As such, not only would the continuance of 
the presumption increase costs on the litigants and the 
industry, it would also increasingly burden an already 
overstretched court system. 
E. Allowing General Rules While Prohibiting Categorical 
Rules 
1. Spillane’s Argument in Favor of the Presumption’s 
Validity 
The eBay Court reversed the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit because it incorrectly asserted 
a “‘general rule’ unique to patent disputes ‘that a permanent 
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been 
adjudged.’”139  Some decisions have looked to this language 
from the Supreme Court to indicate a basic rejection of 
general rules, thereby justifying, for those courts, the 
elimination of the presumption.140  However, Spillane argues 
that general rules are practically inevitable.141  That is, “a 
central tenet of common law jurisprudence is to apply 
preexisting generalized rules to a specific set of 
circumstances, to apply the precedent created by the first 
application to the next case, and so on.”142  Consequently, the 
logic of these courts in denying the presumption is misguided 
because the Supreme Court cannot have rejected the entire 
notion of general rules.  Rather, a rebuttable presumption is 
appropriate so that defendants must show that a copyright 
owner can be made whole through a monetary recovery, 
thereby rendering injunctive relief unnecessary.143 
 
 139.  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006). 
 140.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 289-290. 
 141.  Id. at 290.  
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id.  
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2. Argument against the Presumption’s Validity 
The Supreme Court did not remove the presumption 
merely because the lower courts asserted general rules in 
their decisions.  In eBay, the lower courts placed overbroad 
rules on patent infringement cases.144  The District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia adopted expansive principles 
suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad 
swath of cases.145  The Federal Circuit held that a permanent 
injunction would always issue upon infringement.146  These 
courts both adopted expansive principles, and the Supreme 
Court merely noted that these principles do not comply with 
the four-factor test of equity.147  The Court was not proposing 
that general/categorical rules never be used; rather, in this 
instance, both courts had invented their own general rules 
rather than applying the appropriate four-factor test.148  As 
such, eBay does not affect whether the rebuttable 
presumption that Spillane proposes is or is not a general rule.  
Further, Spillane fails to cite to any court that uses this 
general rule justification to support the removal of the 
presumption.149  This is probably because most courts simply 
justify the removal of the presumption through analysis into 
the intent of the Supreme Court’s eBay decision as well as for 
reasons of equity. 
F. Following the History and Tradition of Equity Practice 
1. Spillane’s Argument in Favor of the Presumption’s 
Validity 
In eBay, the Court applied the traditional four-factor test 
“historically employed by courts of equity.”150  However, 
Spillane argues that a court “laboriously marching through 
equitable factors in copyright infringement suits” does not 
accurately reflect the history and tradition referred to by the 
 
 144.  eBay, 547 U.S. 393-94. 
 145.  Specifically, the court looked to whether a patent holder has a willingness to 
license its patents and a lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents. Id.   
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 394.  
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See Spillane, supra note 2, at 289-90. 
 150.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 390. 
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Court.151  In fact, he cites a nineteenth-century treatise that 
claims equitable remedies are superior to actions at law in 
vindicating copyrights.152  The treatise discusses that “a court 
of equity is manifestly the better forum for the protection of a 
copyright, since a court of law cannot afford as ample 
redress . . . for the prevention of a threatened or anticipated 
violation in the future.”153  In addition, the treatise also 
explains that granting injunctions furthers “preventing 
mischief” and avoids “vexatious litigation.”154  Moreover, 
historical records suggest that legal remedies are 
categorically inadequate in copyright infringement cases.155 
Spillane harmonizes these historic principles with current 
Supreme Court precedent rather awkwardly.  Instead of 
giving plain meaning to the eBay Courts’ statement that a 
plaintiff “must satisfy a four-factor test,” Spillane interprets 
this as not itself requiring that the plaintiff “prove” each 
factor.156  Rather, Spillane’s interpretation provides that only 
in instances where a defendant resists injunction is a plaintiff 
required to prove the four factors.157  Thus, according to this 
interpretation of eBay, the history referred to by the Court 
indicates that injunctions should be commonplace in 
instances of copyright infringement, further supporting the 
contention that the presumption should remain valid. 
2. Argument against the Presumption’s Validity 
The treatises mentioned by Spillane discussing the early 
development of law in both the English and American system 
are not an accurate portrayal of copyright infringement as it 
exists today.  The Supreme Court stated that “given the 
difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary 
remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against 
the owner’s wishes,” it is not surprising that most cases in the 
 
 151.  Spillane, supra note 2, at 290. 
 152.  Id. (quoting  JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 746 (3d 
ed. 1890)). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. (quoting  JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 746 (3d 
ed. 1890)). 
 155.   Id. at 291 (citing H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About 
Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1197 (2008)).  
 156.  Id. at 292. 
 157.  Id.   
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past have granted injunctions upon a showing of 
infringement.158  However, monetary damages today prevent 
mischievous litigation, and therefore a demonstration of 
irreparable harm should be required before granting 
injunctive relief.  Moreover, as discussed above, removing the 
presumption would lower costs as compared to routine 
granting of injunctions in copyright infringement cases.159 
Further, while Chief Justice Roberts did mention cases 
from to the 19th century, it is clear that, when the Court 
determined that the traditional equity factors would apply in 
this context, it did not mean we should follow the precedent 
established in that time period.160  In fact, in Gomez-
Arostegui’s article, which Spillane uses as a foundation for his 
argument, the author states “Chief Justice Roberts’s 
concurrence neither indicates what history we should 
examine (American and/or English) nor how far back to 
look.”161  However, it is clear from the Court’s choice of 
precedent that the Court was discussing only recent American 
history and the recent traditions set forth from these cases.162  
Thus, the fact that historical cases from the 19th century 
granted injunctions in all cases of copyright infringement has 
no substantive bearing on the law as eBay applies it.  
Although injunctive relief was granted in most cases of 
infringement in the past, that reality does not entitle a 
copyrightee to a permanent injunction or justify a general 
rule that such injunctions should issue.163  Therefore, there is 
no need to find a non-obvious, contradictory interpretation of 
the Supreme Court’s language, and harmonize it with English 
or early American case treatment of copyright infringement 
as Spillane attempts. 
 
 
 158.  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, CJ., 
concurring). 
 159.  See supra Part III., Section D., Subpart 2. 
 160.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); See infra note 162. 
 161.  H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright 
Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-At-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 
1210 (2008). 
 162.  eBay, 547 U.S. 391. This is evident from the Courts choice of precedent: Amoco 
Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982).  
 163.  See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395. (Roberts, CJ., concurring). 
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IV. SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENTS FAVORING THE REMOVAL OF 
THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM IN CASES OF 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
Other arguments also demonstrate that the removal of the 
presumption will lead to more equitable results. Specifically, 
presuming irreparable harm prevents a defendant from the 
appropriate discovery required in establishing defenses to 
infringement such as fair use and copyright misuse.164  In 
addition, a historical look at the origins of this presumption 
demonstrates its questionability even pre-eBay.165  Thus, even 
in the copyright context, the effect of the eBay decision in 
removing the presumption is well warranted. 
The copyright misuse defense is an invalidity defense to 
copyright infringement that cannot be established without 
discovery. This defense prohibits recovery for copyright 
infringement when the copyright holder uses the copyright “to 
secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by 
the Copyright Office and which is contrary to public policy.”166  
In order to adequately assert this defense, the defendant must 
first find existence of a period of copyright misuse.167  Then, 
the defendant must determine whether his or her infringing 
use occurred during this period of misuse by the copyright 
holder.168  Both inquiries are matters of fact requiring 
discovery—sometimes, significant amounts of discovery—from 
the copyright holder. 
Another invalidity defense that cannot be fairly 
established without substantial discovery is the fair use 
defense. The indicative factors used in determining fair use 
are (1) consideration of all the evidence; (2) the value of the 
 
 164.  See Roy H. Wepner & Richard W. Ellis, The Federal Circuit’s Presumptively 
Erroneous Presumption of Irreparable Harm, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147, 148 
(2004). The arguments discussed in this section originated in this article.  Whereas the 
ideas expressed in this article primarily addressed patent infringement, similar 
concepts relate to cases of copyright infringement.  
 165.  Id. at 166-168. 
 166.  Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990)(citing 
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942)); Karen E. Georgenson, 
Reverse Engineering of Copyrighted Software: Fair Use or Misuse?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 291, 312-313 (1996).  
 167.  Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979); Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
 168.  AMA, 121 F.3d at 520 (citing Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979); Altera Corp., 424 
F.3d at 1090. 
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copyrighted material and effect on distribution of objects of 
the original work; (3) the nature and objects of the selections 
made; (4) the quantity and value of material used; and (5) the 
degree in which the use may prejudice sales of the original 
work.169  Although some of these facts may be easily 
accessible, it may be impossible to establish certain facts 
without obtaining documents from, and deposing witnesses 
associated with the copyright holder.  Thus, maintaining the 
presumption would prevent a defendant from asserting a 
valid fair use defense.  As such, it is clearly more equitable to 
remove the presumption on this ground as well. 
A historical view of the presumption’s origins shows that 
even its general application to copyright cases is weak.  In 
American Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner Bros. 
Records, Inc.,170 the first case to recognize the presumption in 
copyright cases, the court extended this presumption directly 
from prior case law, indicating that a copyright holder is 
entitled to a preliminary injunction without a detailed 
showing of irreparable harm.171  However, the fact that a 
detailed showing alone is not required to gain injunctive relief 
is a far cry from allowing a presumption that does not require 
any showing of irreparable harm.172  Indeed, such a logical 
leap is unwarranted. As such, in light of the above arguments 
demonstrating the detriment of the presumption in copyright 
infringement cases, the fact that even its foundational 
precedent is arguable supports the notion of its removal. 
 
 
 
 169.  Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 
1943)(stating that “fair use is to be determined by a consideration of all of the evidence, 
and among other elements entering into the determination of the issue, are the extent 
and relative value of copyrighted material, and the effect upon the distribution of 
objects of the original work. Whether a particular use of a copyrighted article, without 
permission of the owner, is a fair use, depends upon the circumstances of the particular 
case, and the court must look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the 
quantity and value of material used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the 
sale, diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the original work . . . .”) (citations 
omitted).  
 170.  389 F.2d 903, 905 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 171.  Wepner & Ellis, supra note 164, at 167.  
 172.  Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay has left 
some dispute as to the continuing validity of the presumption 
of irreparable harm in copyright infringement cases, an in-
depth analysis demonstrates that removing the presumption 
follows from the intent of the Supreme Court and allows for a 
more equitable result. The serious nature of the injunction 
calls for the four-factor test of equity to be used, requiring a 
plaintiff to prove each factor.  Spillane’s arguments proposing 
the survival of the presumption in the wake of eBay and 
Winter are flawed and lead to a less equitable result.  It is 
clear that courts will continue to require a plaintiff to satisfy 
the four-factor test of equity before granting injunctive relief, 
and there is no need for further clarification by the Supreme 
Court. 
 
